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A Unified Theory of Transnational
Procedure
Introduction
Transnational litigation1 in the United States is riddled with a set of
overlapping doctrines which the courts must confront before actually
adjudicating the merits of a dispute. The litigants and the courts fre-
quently must address questions of subject matter jurisdiction orjurisdic-
tion to prescribe, antisuit injunctions, service of process, personal
jurisdiction, venue, choice of law, choice of discovery rules, forum non
conveniens, and other preliminary questions.
This article contends that the separate and sequential analysis of
these doctrines is outmoded, inefficient, and costly to the interests of the
parties, the United States, and the transnational litigation process. Cur-
rently, courts repetitively analyze each of the various gatekeeping doc-
trines through nearly identical open-ended balancing processes which
the courts and the litigants are ill-equipped to handle. This process is
wasteful and filled with error. It also fails to recognize that each of these
doctrinally separate provisions is really part of the same fundamental
inquiry-whether a United States court is an appropriate forum for the
resolution of the dispute through rules of decision and procedure of its
own choosing.
* Associate Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. B.A., University of
Michigan; J.D., Northwestern University Law School. The author gratefully
acknowledges a summer research stipend provided by Dean David G. Trager and
Brooklyn Law School and wishes to thank all his colleagues both within and outside
of Brooklyn Law School for their patience in allowing him to pester them regarding
this project over the last year. In particular, thanks go to Ronald A. Brand, Maryellen
Fullerton, Jeffrey Stempel, and Louise Teitz, who took the time to comment on drafts
of the paper, and to Elizabeth Stem and Tracey Bernstein for their research
assistance.
1. The term "transnational litigation" is used throughout this article to refer to
litigation in United States courts involving one or more foreign parties, foreign trans-
actions, or conduct with consequences or effects within the United States. This arti-
cle focuses primarily on disputes with foreign private parties but would encompass
foreign public entities and government units. Transnational litigation in this sense
would include disputes traditionally viewed as involving either public or private inter-
national law.
26 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 101 (1993)
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All parties involved in transnational litigations would benefit from
the abandonment of the current doctrinal confusion in favor of a single
unified approach to the determination of the appropriateness of a
United States court as the forum for resolving the merits of transna-
tional disputes. I propose as that unified approach a single omnibus
comity inquiry conducted as early as possible in the litigation process.
This unified approach offers the advantage of consolidating and
accelerating consideration of the same group of factors which courts
now consider at various stages of the litigation under different burdens
of proof and standards of review. Parties and courts would be forced to
confront, at the outset of the litigation, the real issue of whether the
United States has any direct and substantial interest in the resolution of
the dispute. The result would be less cost, less delay, as well as more
domestic and international legitimacy for the resolution of disputes in
the United States, if the courts were to make principled, evidence-based
rulings of their interests and bases for adjudicating a transnational
dispute.
Part I of this article examines the current doctrinal mess in which
the courts have required the endless repetition of the same or similar
balancing tests for most of the important procedural and jurisdictional
issues in transnational litigation. Part II analyzes the redundancy of
these doctrines and argues that each of these doctrinal tests is a subpart
of the larger question-whether the United States is an appropriate
forum for the resolution of the dispute on the merits. Part III then
argues that the current process can be replaced by a unified omnibus
motion imposed as a matter of federal common law in both state and
federal courts as a result of the preeminent and exclusive role of federal
law in matters touching on foreign relations and foreign commerce.
Finally, Part IV proposes the preparation and adoption of a Manual for
Transnational Procedure as a means to achieve the implementation of
the unified theory and to guide courts in the difficult path of balancing
United States and foreign interests and applying comity principles in
transnational litigation.
I. The Doctrinal Stew
The explosive growth of transnational litigation has forced courts in the
United States to consider how to apply traditional procedural and juris-
dictional doctrines to foreign persons and disputes arising outside of the
United States. United States courts currently may adjudicate such dis-
putes, but must consider the implications of international comity before
proceeding. This consideration of comity has manifested itself in the
requirement of considering the foreign interests involved in the specific
dispute and comparing the importance of the foreign interests to those
of the United States. This type of balancing approach has been a favor-
ite of the federal courts, and almost every transnational procedural doc-
trine now calls for some form of interest balancing.
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A. Jurisdiction to Prescribe and Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Jurisdiction to prescribe is the ability of a nation to make its law applica-
ble to the activities, relations, or status of persons, or the interests of
persons in things, whether by legislation, executive act or order, admin-
istrative rule or regulation, or judicial decision. 2 Jurisdiction to pre-
scribe is a concept of international law which focuses on the propriety of
one nation prohibiting conduct affecting more than one nation.
Although it often overlaps with concerns over subject matter jurisdiction
in United States law, the focus is somewhat different than that of subject
matter jurisdiction, which concerns the allocation of jurisdiction
between state and federal courts.3
The development of both of these concepts in the United States
arose primarily in the application of the United States antitrust laws to
collusive conduct taking place abroad.4 The definitive application of the
antitrust laws to conduct wholly outside the United States came in the
Second Circuit's decision in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America.5 The
Alcoa court held that U.S. courts had jurisdiction over the cartel activities
of bauxite producers outside of the United States where the conduct was
intended to, and actually did, affect the United States.6 In so holding,
the Alcoa court considered economic effects within the United States to
be indistinguishable from actual conduct within our borders. 7
Because of the perceived expansion and abuse of the intended
effects test,8 the American Law Institute sought to limit the effects test in
2. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 401(a) (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)].
3. Id. § 401 cmt. c.
4. United States foreign commerce antitrust cases have presented a blend of
concepts from both subject matter jurisdiction and jurisdiction to prescribe. While
the question of whether Congress intended the antitrust laws to apply to foreign
conduct abroad is a matter of Constitutional and statutory law, the courts have
approached extraterritoriality in antitrust actions differently from other areas. The
courts in most other areas have limited their inquiry to whether the text of the federal
statute or its legislative history explicitly provides for extraterritorial application. In
the area of antitrust and certain economic regulatory schemes, the courts have
employed a comity based approach, balancing the interests of the United States and
the affected foreign nation. This approach is quite similar to the process used in
determining whether the United States had jurisdiction to prescribe the harmful con-
duct as a matter of international law.
5. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 443-44 (2d Cir. 1945)
(on certification and transfer from the United States Supreme Court for lack of a
quorum of qualifiedjudges). The Supreme Court in American Banana Co. v. United
Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356-59 (1909) held that U.S. antitrust laws could not reach
conduct outside of the United States. Shortly thereafter, the Supreme Court in
United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268, 276 (1927) indicated that conduct
occurring partly in the United States could form the basis of an antitrust suit. Cf.,
United States v. Pacific & Arctic Ry. & Navigation Co., 228 U.S. 87, 105-06 (1913)
(agreement between United States and foreign parties regarding transportation
between United States and foreign ports held violation of Sherman Act).
6. 148 F.2d at 443.
7. Id. at 444-45.
8. Later decisions interpreted Alcoa expansively. See cases collected in Note,
Extraterritorial Application of the Antitrust Laws, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1452 (1956). For
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two significant ways in its Restatement (Second) of the Foreign Rela-
tions Law of the United States.9 The Second Restatement modified the
effects test so that a state would have jurisdiction over conduct outside
its territory only if there was a direct, substantial, and foreseeable effect
within its territory.' 0
The Second Restatement also proposed an interest balancing test to
avoid contradictory legal rulings where two or more states may have
jurisdiction under the effects test. Section 40 of the Second Restate-
ment states:
Where two states have jurisdiction to prescribe and enforce rules of law
and the rules they may prescribe require inconsistent conduct upon the
part of a person, each state is required by international law to consider, in
good faith, moderating the exercise of its enforcement jurisdiction, in the
light of such factors as
(a) vital national interests of each of the states,
(b) the extent and the nature of the hardship that inconsistent
enforcement actions would impose upon the person,
(c) the extent to which the required conduct is to take place in the
territory of the other state,
(d) the nationality of the person, and
(e) the extent to which enforcement by action of either state can
reasonably be expected to achieve compliance with the rule prescribed by
that state.11
The seminal judicial adoption of this type of comity analysis came in
the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Timberlane Lumber Company v. Bank of
example, the United States through May 1973 filed 249 antitrust suits involving for-
eign trade. None were dismissed for lack ofjurisdiction. WILBUR L. FUGATE, FOR-
EIGN COMMERCE AND THE ANTITRUST LAws 498-543 app. B (2d ed. 1973). The courts
often paid little, if any, attention to the intent component of the test. See, e.g., Sabre
Shipping Corp. v. American Presidents Line, 285 F. Supp. 949, 953 (S.D.N.Y. 1968),
appeal denied, 407 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., Japan Line Ltd. v. Sabre
Shipping Corp., 395 U.S. 922 (1969). In addition, the courts increasingly found triv-
ial effects sufficient to adjudicate the conduct of foreigners abroad under U.S. anti-
trust law. See, e.g., Dominicus Americana Bohio v. Gulf & Western Indus., 473 F.
Supp. 680, 687 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (subject matter jurisdiction if effect is more than de
minimis).
9. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF THE UNITED STATES
(1965).
10. Id. § 18. Section 18 states in full:
A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law attaching legal conse-
quences to conduct that occurs outside its territory and causes an effect
within its territory, if either
(a) the conduct and its effect are generally recognized as constituent ele-
ments of a crime or tort under the law of states that have reasonably devel-
oped legal systems, or
(b) (i) the conduct and its effect are constituent elements of activity to
which the rule applies; (ii) the effect within the territory is substantial; (iii) it
occurs as a direct and foreseeable result of the conduct outside the territory;
and (iv) the rule is not inconsistent with the principles of justice generally
recognized by states that have reasonably developed legal systems.
11. Id. § 40.
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America.12 Timberlane involved an alleged conspiracy to prevent the
plaintiff from milling lumber in Honduras and exporting it to the United
States, in order to aid competitors financed by the Bank of America.
Following the dismissal of the complaint under the traditional
effects test, the Ninth Circuit rejected the effects test as incomplete
because of the test's failure to consider other nations' interests. The
Court announced a new three-part test stating:
[The antitrust laws require in the first instance that there be some effect-
actual or intended--on American foreign commerce before the federal
courts may legitimately exercise subject matter jurisdiction under those
statutes. Second, a greater showing of burden or restraint may be neces-
sary to demonstrate that the effect is sufficiently large to present a cogni-
zable injury to the plaintiffs and, therefore, a civil violation of the antitrust
laws. Third, there is the additional question which is unique to the inter-
national setting of whether the interests of, and links to, the United
States-including the magnitude of the effect on American foreign com-
merce-are sufficiently strong, vis-a-vis those of other nations, to justify
an assertion of extraterritorial authority.' 3
The Court stated that a court should weigh the following elements
in determining whether or not to exercise jurisdiction:
(1) the degree of conflict with foreign law or policy;
(2) the nationality, location, and principal places of business of the
parties;
(3) the extent to which enforcement by either state can achieve
compliance;
(4) the relative significance of the effects on the United States as com-
pared with those elsewhere;
(5) the existence of an intent to harm or affect American commerce;
(6) the foreseeability of such effect; and
(7) the relative importance of conduct in the United States as compared
with conduct abroad. 14
Timberlane has been widely, but not universally, followed.' 5 The
12. Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976), on
appeal following remand, 749 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1032
(1985).
13. Id. at 613 (citations omitted).
14. Id. at 614.
15. Although influential, the balancing of interest approach endorsed by
Timberlane has never been expressly adopted by the Supreme Court and has not been
followed by all of the federal appellate courts. The Second Circuit in National Bank
of Canada v. Interbank Card Ass'n, 666 F.2d 6, 8 (2d Cir. 1981), has adopted a varia-
tion of the Alcoa test requiring proof of an actual anticompetitive effect within the
United States in order to confer jurisdiction over conduct outside the United States.
The Seventh Circuit continues to apply the Alcoa intended effects test. In re Uranium
Antitrust Litig., 617 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1980). The D.C. Circuit also has rejected the
Timberlane approach. Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgium World Airlines, 731
F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984). See generally SPENCER WEBER WALLER, INTERNATIONAL
TRADE AND U.S. ANTrrausT LAw § 5.08 (1992) (discussing the continued use of
effects test and other alternative approaches to comity in foreign commerce antitrust
cases); Spencer Weber Waller, Bringing Meaning to Interest Balancing in Transnational
Litigation, 23 VAND.J. TRANSNAT'L L. 925, 928 n.8 (1991) [hereinafter Waller, Bringing
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Third Circuit in Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp. 16 adopted its
own version of the Timberlane balancing test, using a slightly different list
of factors. 17 Another variation of Timberlane adopted by the Fifth Circuit
would require a similar balancing of United States and foreign national
interests, not as an exercise in comity, but as an affirmative element of
jurisdiction. 18
The Third Restatement of Foreign Relations Law sought to codify
reasonableness as a principle of international law.' 9 It permits jurisdic-
tion over conduct which was either intended to produce significant
effects within a jurisdiction, or which in fact produced such effects if
such jurisdiction is "reasonable." ' 20 The Restatement measures reason-
ableness through a laundry list of factors similar to those outlined in
Timberlane, Mannington Mills, and the Second Restatement. 2 '
Meaning to -Interest Balancing] (discussing limited application of comity based balancing
tests outside of antitrust law).
16. 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979).
17. Mannington Mills sets forth ten factors to be considered:
1. The degree of conflict with foreign law or policy;
2. The nationality of the parties;
3. The relative importance of the alleged violation of conduct here com-
pared to that abroad;
4. The availability of a remedy abroad and the pendency of litigation there;
5. The existence of intent to harm or affect American commerce and its
foreseeability;
6. The possible effect upon foreign relations if the court exercises jurisdic-
tion and grants relief;
7. If relief is granted, whether a party will be placed in the position of being
forced to perform an act illegal in either country or be under conflicting
requirements by both countries;
8. Whether the court can make its order effective;
9. Whether an order for relief would be acceptable in this country if made
by the foreign nation under similar circumstances; and
10. Whether a treaty with the affected nations has addressed the issue.
Id. at 1297-98.
18. Industrial Inv. Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., 671 F.2d 876, 883-84 (5th Cir. 1982),
vacated, 460 U.S. 1007, and aff'd, 704 F.2d 785 (5th Cir. 1983).
19. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 2, § 403.
20. Id § 402 (Introductory Note). Although the balancing of interests is
mandatory to determine reasonableness under the Restatement, it is unclear whether
the Restatement requires a state to defer to another state with greater interests in a
particular controversy. Section 403(3) of the Restatement Third states that following
the balancing of interests, a state "should" defer to a foreign state with greater
interests.
21. Section 403 of the Restatement Third requires a consideration of all factors,
including:
a) the link of the activity to the territory of the regulatory state, i.e., the
extent to which the activity takes place within the territory, or has substan-
tial, direct, and foreseeable effect upon or in the territory;
b) the connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic activity,
between the regulating state and the person principally responsible for
the activity to be regulated, or between that state and those whom the
regulation is designed to protect;
c) the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of the regula-
tion to the regulating state, the extent to which other states regulate such
Pol ,26
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The decisions applying the different versions of the balancing test
for jurisdiction to prescribe have brought little content to the process.
For example, after the remand in the Timberlane litigation, the district
court again dismissed the complaint by applying the new balancing
test.22 The Ninth Circuit ultimately affirmed the dismissal in conclusory
fashion, stating:
It follows that all but two of the factors in Timberlane rs comity analy-
sis indicate that we should refuse to exercise jurisdiction over this anti-
trust case. The potential for conflict with Honduran economic policy and
commercial law is great. The effect on the foreign commerce of the
United States is minimal. The evidence of intent to harm American com-
merce is altogether lacking. The foreseeability of the anticompetitive
consequences of the allegedly illegal actions is slight. Most of the con-
duct that must be examined occurred abroad. The factors that favor
jurisdiction are the citizenship of the parties and, to a slight extent, the
enforcement effectiveness of United States law. We do not believe that
this is enough to justify the exercise of federal jurisdiction over this
case.
2 3
Even where courts cite the Restatement, they are often doing nothing
more than justifying an intuitive result rather than engaging in a sophis-
ticated balancing of interests. 2 4
B. Personal Jurisdiction
Notions of comity and interest balancing have spread to the analysis of
personal jurisdiction in transnational litigation. Traditionally, a defend-
ant must have at least "minimum contacts" with the forum for the asser-
tion ofjurisdiction to comport with the notions of fundamental fairness
implicit in the Due Process Clause of both the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments of the United States Constitution.2 5 The minimum con-
tacts must have a basis in "some act by which the defendant purposefully
avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum
activities, and the degree to which the desirability of such regulation is
generally accepted;
d) the existence ofjustified expectations that might be protected or hurt by
the regulation;
e) the importance of the regulation to the international political, legal, or
economic system;
f) the extent to which the regulation is consistent with the traditions of the
international system;
g) the extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating the
activity; and
h) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by another state.
22. 574 F. Supp. 1453 (N.D. Cal. 1983).
23. 749 F.2d at 1386.
24. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF THE UNITED
STATES, CUMULATIVE ANNUAL SUPPLEMENT (1991) (discussing cases citing to § 403
and prior tentative drafts).
25. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985); International
Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
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State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws." 2 6
The Supreme Court has expanded the minimum contacts test in
transnational litigation to include the concept of comity and has used
interest balancing to determine whether the assertion of personal juris-
diction over a foreign defendant is reasonable. In Asahi Metal Industry
Co. v. Superior Court,2 7 the Court considered a product liability suit
brought by an American consumer against a Japanese manufacturer of
motorcycle tires. The Japanese defendant brought an indemnity claim
against the Taiwanese company which manufactured the tire valves.
Following a settlement between the American plaintiff and the Japanese
defendant, the Supreme Court held that the United States did not have
personal jurisdiction over the claim between the two foreign parties.2 8
A majority of the Court held that the extension of personal jurisdic-
tion over the Taiwanese defendant would offend "traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice." 2 9 The Court held that the reasonable-
ness of personal jurisdiction over a foreign defendant depended upon:
1) the burden on the defendant;
2) the interests of the forum state;
3) the plaintiff's interest in obtaining relief;
4) the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient
resolution of controversies; and
5) the shared interests of the several States in furthering fundamental
substantive social policies. 3
0
The Court concluded that the U.S. interests in the dispute were
"slight," and the assertion of jurisdiction by the United States would
impose great burdens on the Taiwanese defendant.3 ' The Court stated:
[T]he Federal Government's interest in its foreign relations policies, will
be best served by a careful inquiry into the reasonableness of the asser-
tion ofjurisdiction in the particular case, and an unwillingness to find the
serious burdens on an alien defendant outweighed by minimal interests
on the part of the plaintiff or the forum state. Great care and reserve
should be exercised when extending our notions of personal jurisdiction
26. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475; Hanson v. Denkla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
Accord, World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980);
McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957).
For purposes of certain federal causes of action, it will be sufficient if the defendant
has minimum contacts with the United States as a whole. Newport Components, Inc.
v. NEC Home Elecs. (U.S.A.), Inc., 671 F. Supp. 1525, 1537-40 (C.D. Cal. 1987);
General Elec. Co. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 550 F. Supp. 1037, 1043-44 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
27. 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
28. Id. at 112. The Court split evenly as to whether the Taiwanese corporation's
awareness that its products were entering into United States commerce was sufficient
to satisfy the minimum contacts test for personal jurisdiction. Id. at 107, 112.
29. Id, at 113 (citing International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316, and Milliken v. Meyer, 311
U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
30. Id. at 113 (citing World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292).
31. Id. at 114. The Court also noted the probable jurisdiction of both the Japa-
nese and Taiwanese courts and the difficult choice of law questions if the United
States court asserted jurisdiction. Id.
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into the international field.3 2
C. Choice of Discovery Rules
Comity concerns also have pervaded the discovery process in transna-
tional litigation. In transnational litigation, courts must decide whether
the parties may proceed under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or
must use the more cumbersome and restrictive procedures of the Hague
Convention on the Taking of Evidence in Civil and Commercial Mat-
ters,3 3 to which the United States is a signatory.3 4 Because of the diffi-
culties associated with the use of the Hague Convention, a conflict
developed in both state and federal court over whether the Hague Con-
vention was the required, or preferred, method for obtaining discovery
of evidence abroad.3 5
The Supreme Court addressed this issue in Socie' Nationale Indus-
trielle Adrospatiale v. United States District Court,3 6 holding that the Hague
32. Id. at 115 (citations omitted).
The impact of Asahi has been muted by three developments. First, the Supreme
Court in Burnham v. Superior Court of California, Main, 495 U.S. 604 (1990),
upheld personal jurisdiction based on personal service of process on a defendant
physically within California on a transient basis. If the result of Burnham is applied to
a foreign defendant who is physically present in the United States at the time of ser-
vice, then much of the rationale of Asahi will be eviscerated. Second, Asahi did not
resolve the legality of personal jurisdiction based upon the defendant's act of know-
ingly placing goods into the stream of commerce in the United States. Since the
Supreme Court split equally on this issue, the lower courts have continued to apply
the "stream of commerce" theory without any further balancing of interests where
the law of the circuit or state supreme court permits. See, e.g., Dehmlow v. Austin
Fireworks, 963 F.2d 941 (7th Cir. 1992); Gulf Consol. Servs., Inc. v. Corinth
Pipeworks, S.A., 898 F.2d 1071 (5th Cir. 1990); Irving v. Owens-Coming Fiberglass
Corp., 864 F.2d 383 (5th Cir. 1989); Mason v. F. LLI Luigi, 832 F.2d 383 (7th Cir.
1987); Cox v. Hozelock, 411 S.E.2d 640 (N.C. App. 1992). Cf., Morris v. SSE, Inc.,
843 F.2d 489 (11 th Cir. 1988). Finally, Asahi has been undermined by the tendency
of courts to rely on the traditional minimum contacts analysis to demonstrate the
reasonableness of asserting personal jurisdiction over a foreign defendant. Koteen v.
Bermuda Cablevision, Ltd., 913 F.2d 973, 975 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Farmers Ins.
Exchange v. Portage La Prairie Mut. Ins. Co., 907 F.2d 911, 913 (9th Cir. 1990);
Falkirk Mining Co. v. The Japan Steel Works, Ltd., 906 F.2d 369 (8th Cir. 1990).
33. Convention of the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Criminal Matters,
opened for signature Mar. 18, 1970, T.I.A.S. No. 7444, 23 U.N.T.S. 2555. Argentina,
Barbados, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, Federal Republic of
Germany, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Singa-
pore, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States are signatories to
this convention.
34. Taking evidence under the Hague Convention is very different from tradi-
tional discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See generally WALLER,
INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND U.S. ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 15, § 7.08. For a detailed
examination of the procedures applicable in each signatory to the Hague Conven-
tion, see BRUNO RISTAU, 1 INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL AsSISTANCE § 5 (1984).
35. A letter rogatory or letter of request remains the exclusive vehicle to obtain
discovery from a third party witness. See FED. R. Civ. P. 28. If the country in which
the third party witness is located is not a signatory to the Hague Convention, then the
foreign court may enforce the letter rogatory or letter of request as a matter of
comity.
36. 482 U.S. 522 (1987).
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Convention was neither the exclusive nor the preferred method of seek-
ing foreign located discovery from a party.3 7 The Court relied on a
comity approach and required courts to select the applicable discovery
rules on a case-by-case basis by balancing:
1) the particular facts of the case;
2) the sovereign interests of the two legal systems; and
3) the likelihood that the choice of discovery rules will be effective.3 8
As is the case with much judicial comity analysis, the post-Airospa-
tiale decisions have not been particularly sophisticated. Most courts
have avoided the delicate balancing process called for in Airospatiale and
have simply allocated the burden of proof to the party opposing the use
of the Federal Rules.39
D. Conflicts of Law
The development of modem conflicts theory has involved a similar
movement towards a broad balancing of interests test. The Second
Restatement of Conflicts of Law4 ° expressly adopted a balancing system
in order to select the forum with the center of gravity or most significant
relationship with the dispute. Section 6 of the Restatement requires
consideration of:
1) the needs of the interstate and international systems,
2) the relevant policies of the forum,
3) the relevant policies of other interested states including their interests
in having their law applied to the particular issue,
4) the protection of party expectations,
5) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law,
6) the objectives of certainty, predictability, and uniformity of result, and
7) the ease of determining and applying the law previously identified as
applicable.4 1
The Second Conflicts Restatement then analyzes various substan-
tive areas of law and sets forth contacts and other factors which courts
should apply in light of the policies outlined in Section 6. For example,
in the tort area, Section 145 of the Second Restatement requires a con-
sideration of such factors as:
a) the place where the injury occurred,
37. Id. at 529.
38. Id. at 544.
39. Doster v. Carl Schenk A.G., 141 F.R.D. 50 (M.D.N.C. 1991); Rich v. KIS Cal.,
Inc., 121 F.R.D. 254, 257 (M.D.N.C. 1988); Haynes v. Kleinwefers, 119 F.R.D. 335
(E.D.N.Y. 1988); Benton Graphic v. Uddeholm Corp., 118 F.R.D. 386, 388-89 (D.N.J.
1987); Sandsend Fin. Consultants v. Wood, 743 S.W.2d 364 (Tex. App. 1988);
Scarminach v. Goldwell GmbH, 531 N.Y.S.2d 188, 190-91 (Sup. Ct. 1988). Cf., Rob-
erts v. Heim, 130 F.R.D. 430 (N.D. Cal. 1990). But see In re Perrier Bottled Water
Litig., 138 F.R.D. 348 (D. Conn. 1991) (requiring first use of Hague Convention
under balancing test); Hudson v. Hermann Pfauter GmbH & Co., 117 F.R.D. 33, 35-
36 (N.D.N.Y. 1987) (placing burden on party opposing use of Hague Convention).
40. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws (1971).
41. Id. § 6.
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b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred,
c) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place
of business of the parties, and
d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is
centered.
These contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative impor-
tance with respect to the particular issue.4
2
The decision process in jurisdictions applying so-called "interest
analysis" in choice of law determinations is somewhat more complicated
because they employ a similar vocabulary with a different meaning from
that used in other areas of transnational procedure. 43 In interest analy-
sis, the court seeks to determine whether the forum has any appreciable
interest in the application of its law to a particular dispute where the
legislature or the common law is silent as to the reach of the rule of
decision. 44 The court's primary task is the identification of false con-
flicts where the forum has no real interest in the application of its law.
4 5
This approach often manifests itself as a one-way analysis of the inter-
ests of the forum, rather than an explicit balancing of the substantive
interests of two or more forums.
46
Unfortunately, nothing in the field of conflicts of law is simple.
Brainerd Currie, one of the founders of interest analysis, has expressly
argued against any explicit balancing of state interests in the event of a
"true" conflict. 47 Another branch of interest analysis would expressly
balance the substantive interests of the potential fora in search of "the
better law" to apply to a dispute.48 To further complicate matters, all
aspects of interest analysis have been subject to heavy criticism, 49 with
commentators offering a plethora of eclectic combinations of
approaches, solutions, and replacements.
50
42. Id. § 145.
43. See Waller, Bringing Meaning to Interest Balancing, supra note 15, at 948-51.
44. See generally BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICTS OF LAWS
(1963).
45. Id. at 60.
46. See Waller, Bringing Meaning to Interest Balancing, supra note 15, at 948-51.
47. CURRIE, supra note 44, at 182, 606, 610, 617 (1963); Brainerd Currie, Notes on
Methods and Objectives in the Conflicts of Law, 1959 DUKE L.J. 171, 176.
48. ROBERT A. LEFLAR ET AL., AMERICAN CONFLICTS OF LAw § 95, § 107 (4th ed.
1986); RUSSELLJ. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICTS OF LAw 304-07 (3d
ed. 1986); ARTHUR TAYLOR VON MEHREN & DONALD THEODORE TRAUTMAN, THE LAW
OF MULTISTATE PROBLEMS 341-375 (1965); Robert A. Leflar, The Nature of Conflicts
Law, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1080 (1981); Arthur Taylor Von Mehren, Recent Trends in
Choice-of-Law Methodology, 60 CORNELL L. REV. 927 (1975). Despite the use of differ-
ent labels, all of the approaches depending on an actual balancing of interests of the
applicable jurisdictions partake of the better law approach to varying degrees.
EUGENE F. SCOLES & PETER HAY, CONFLICTS OF LAw § 2.11 (2d ed. 1992).
49. See, e.g., Friedrich K. Juenger, Conflict of Laws: A Critique of Interest Analysis, 32
AM.J. CoMP. L. 1 (1984).
50. See Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The Constitu-
tional Foundations of Choice of Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 249, 252-56 (1992) [hereinafter
Laycock, Equal Citizens]; Larry Kramer, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 1990:
Trends and Developments, 39 AM.J. COMP. L. 465 (1991); P. John Kozyris & Symeon C.
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E. Forum Non Conveniens
The doctrine of forum non conveniens as applied by the Supreme Court
in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert5 1 and Piper Aircraft Company v. Reyno 5 2 incorpo-
rates the most complete, but discretionary, interest balancing by a fed-
eral district court in transnational litigation. The doctrine of forum non
conveniens permits a court to abstain from the exercise of jurisdiction
where the forum chosen by the plaintiff is manifestly unjust to the
defendant and a more convenient forum exists for the resolution of the
dispute. 53 The Supreme Court has indicated that a district court must
explicitly consider and balance both public and private factors including:
1) the relative ease of access to sources of proof;
2) the availability of compulsory process for the attendance of unwilling
witnesses;
3) the costs of obtaining attendance of willing witnesses;
4) the need to inspect the premises or physical subject of the dispute;
5) all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expedi-
tious, and inexpensive;
6) the administrative difficulties flowing from court congestion;
7) the local interest in having localized controversies resolved at home;
8) the familiarity of the tribunal with the law to be enforced;
9) the avoidance of unnecessary conflicts of law and foreign law
problems; and
10) the unfairness of burdening citizens in an unrelated forum with jury
duty. 54
Under this vague and open-ended balancing test, the court may
decline to hear the case where, on balance, it is inconvenient to do so, as
long as another jurisdiction is better able to resolve the dispute.5 5 The
district court should refuse to dismiss the action unless the balancing of
interests strongly favors the movant.5 6 However, the court may still dis-
miss the action despite proper subject matter jurisdiction, personal
jurisdiction, and satisfaction of the other gatekeeping provisions.
While parties may make a forum non conveniens motion at any time
during the litigation, 57 the district court may consider the timing of the
Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 1989: An Overview, 38 AM.J. COMP.
L. 601 (1990); Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 1988, 37
AM. J. CoMp. L. 457 (1989); Bruce Posnak, Choice of Law--Rules vs. Analysis: A More
Workable Marriage than the (Second) Restatement; A Very Well-Curried Leflar Over Reese
Approach, 40 MERCER L. REV. 869 (1989).
51. 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
52. 454 U.S. 235 (1981).
53. Although a forum non conveniens dismissal requires that there be an alter-
nate forum capable of resolving the dispute and providing some remedy, the gov-
erning law and procedure need not be as favorable to the plaintiff as it is in the
United States. Reyno, 454 U.S. at 247-52. Nor is a foreign plaintiff's selection of the
United States as a forum accorded significant weight. Id. at 255-56.
54. Reyno, 454 U.S. at 241 n.6; GulfOil, 330 U.S. at 508-09.
55. Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 511.
56. Id. at 508.
57. Snam Progetti S.P.A. v. Lauro Lines, 387 F. Supp. 322 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Spen-
cer v. Alcoa S.S. Co., 221 F. Supp. 343 (E.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 324 F.2d 957 (2d Cir. 1963);
Vol, 26
1993 Unified Theory of Transnational Procedure
motion in conducting the balancing of interests mandated by the
Supreme Court.5 8 The district court's decision is reviewable only for an
abuse of discretion, such as a failure to weigh a relevant factor or the
improper consideration of irrelevant matters.5 9
F. Antisuit Injunctions
The final principal strand of the transnational procedural doctrine
emphasizing interest balancing 60 relates to parties' attempts to prevent
their opponents from proceeding against them in foreign jurisdictions,
or to prevent their opponents from interfering with the jurisdiction of
the forum hearing the dispute. Both the offensive and defensive variety
of such action fall under the rubric of "antisuit injunctions."
The cases have adopted a relatively narrow concept of interest bal-
ancing in the area of antisuit injunctions. The D.C. Circuit in Laker Air-
ways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgium World Airlines6 ' has limited antisuit
injunctions to those situations necessary to protect the court's jurisdic-
tion or the critical public policies of the forum. The Second Circuit in
China Trade and Development Corp. v. M.V. Choong Young 62 adopted a simi-
larly narrow position.
Both courts explicitly rejected the approach of earlier cases which
required a broader consideration of:
1) the frustration of a policy in the enjoining forum;
2) the vexatiousness of the foreign action;
3) the threat to the court's jurisdiction;
4) whether the forum proceedings threaten other equitable interests; and
5) whether adjudication in separate actions would result in delay, incon-
venience, expense, inconsistency or a race to judgment.63
Fifth & Walnut, Inc. v. Loews, Inc., 76 F. Supp. 64, 67 (S.D.N.Y. 1948). Accord, 15
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3828 (1986 & 1991
Supp.).
58. In re Air Crash Disaster Near New Orleans, 821 F.2d. 1147 (5th Cir. 1987),
vacated sub nom., Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. Lopez, 490 U.S. 1032 (1989).
59. See, e.g., R. Maganlal & Co. v. M.G. Chem. Co. Inc., 942 F.2d 164 (2d. Cir.
1991).
60. Versions of balancing tests exist to a lesser extent in certain formulations of
the act of state doctrine, the foreign sovereign compulsion defense, and the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act. See W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Environmental Tectonics
Corp., 493 U.S. 400 (1990); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 440
n.1, 447 (1964) (J. White, dissenting) (articulating theory of judicial deference to
executive branch actions depending on balancing of interests at stake in litigation);
28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1988) (jurisdiction of commercial acts abroad of foreign
governments and instrumentalities where direct effect in United States demon-
strated). See Spencer Weber Waller, Redefining the Foreign Compulsion Doctrine in U.S.
Antitrust Law: The Japanese Auto Restraints and Beyond, 14 LAW & POL'Y INV'L Bus. 747,
801-09 (1982) (analyzing formulations of sovereign compulsion defense based on
balancing interests of defendant, foreign government, and United States).
61. 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
62. 837 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1987).
63. American Home Assurance Co. v. Insurance Corp. of Ir., 603 F. Supp. 636,
643 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
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Although the courts appear to reject the specific considerations pro-
posed by the earlier line of cases, they have not rejected the concept of
balancing itself. Both the D.C. Circuit and the Second Circuit have
explicitly cited comity concerns as the basis for limiting the use of
antisuit injunctions.64 Comity has always called for the analysis of for-
eign interests and the deference to those important interests in the
absence of some overriding domestic interest. Ironically, the doctrine of
comity underlies the broad interest balancing concept which is what the
courts purported to limit in this particular context. 6 5
G. The Worst of All Possible Worlds
The current system is wasteful, inefficient, and unfair. Each separate
gatekeeping provision is time consuming and costly. Taken together,
the cost of discovery, briefing, and argument make litigation impossible
for all but the most massive cases with unlimited legal budgets. Litigat-
ing even more than one of these issues sequentially can easily render
litigation impractical for small and medium sized disputes. 66
The present system creates powerful incentives to avoid transna-
tional litigation in the United States at all costs. The system is particu-
larly burdensome in tort and related statutory types of actions where the
parties do not have the luxury of specifying in advance the desired judi-
cial or arbitral forum. The present system also contributes to the pres-
ent impasse where no foreign nation has been willing to enter into a
treaty with the United States obligating the enforcement of U.S.
judgments. 6 7
The three district court opinions in the Laker litigation reflect the
classic but unnecessary repetition of the balancing approaches devel-
oped under the different doctrinal tests. The Laker case was an antitrust
action filed by Laker Airways' bankruptcy trustee in the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia. The trustee alleged a con-
spiracy by American, British, or other foreign airlines to put Laker Air-
ways out of business. The British defendants obtained injunctions and
equivalent orders under the British Protection of Trading Interests Act
prohibiting Laker from proceeding against them in England. Laker then
sought an injunction to prevent the remaining defendants from pursu-
ing any similar antisuit injunctions in foreign courts.
64. See Sea Containers Ltd. v. Stena AB, 890 F.2d 1205, 1213 (D.C. Cir. 1989);
China Trade, 837 F.2d at 35-36; Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 928, 956.
65. Id.
66. Anecdotal and personal experience suggest that no dispute involving less
than one half million dollars willjustify the kind of litigation budget to support multi-
ple motion practice.
67. See generally RONALD A. BRAND, ENFORCING FOREIGNJUDGMENTS IN THE UNITED
STATES AND UNrED STATES JUDGMENTs ABROAD (1992). To the contrary, some
nations have enacted blocking statutes affirmatively barring the enforcement of
United States judgments under specified circumstances. See, e.g., Protection of Trad-
ing Interests Act 1980, ch. 11 (Eng.).
Vol. 26
1993 Unified Theory of Transnational Procedure
The district court granted the injunction, reasoning that because
Laker would not be able to proceed in the courts of Great Britain, the
denial of Laker's antitrust claims in the United States would effectively
preclude Laker from having any remedy at all and that such irreparable
injury far outweighed the harm the foreign air carriers doing business in
the United States would suffer from having to defend the lawsuit on the
merits in the United States. 68 While the court recognized that the ques--
tion before it was closely related to the questions ofjurisdiction to pre-
scribe and forum non conveniens, it expressly deferred consideration of
those issues as premature. 69
Less than two months later, the court tackled the question of forum
non conveniens. In a separate opinion, the court granted the plaintiff's
motion for partial summary judgment eliminating the defendant's
affirmative defense of forum non conveniens. 70 The court noted that
much of the prior opinion was dispositive of this issue71 and held that a
dismissal on forum non conveniens was not appropriate since Great
Britain could not and would not provide a forum for the resolution of
the plaintiff's antitrust claims. 72
Six months later, the court returned to the crux of the matter-
namely whether the United States or Great Britain was the exclusive or
preferred forum for the resolution of the merits of the dispute. The
court confirmed its own jurisdiction and appointed an amicus to repre-
sent the interests of the plaintiff in the United States litigation to the
extent that it was barred from doing so as a result of the British judicial
and administrative orders. 73 The status quo was ultimately affirmed by
the Court of Appeals as the court held that there was nothing a United
States court could do to interfere with foreign injunctions, but that the
court was entitled to protect its own jurisdiction from further
encroachment.74
The most casual inquiry shows the redundancy of the court's
approach.75 The court had already decided every element of a forum
68. Laker Airways Ltd. v. Pan Am. World Airways, 559 F. Supp. 1124, 1136-39
(D.D.C. 1983).
69. Id. at 1135.
70. 568 F. Supp. 811 (D.D.C. 1983).
71. Id. at 813.
72. Id. at 817.
73. 577 F. Supp. 348 (D.D.C. 1983).
74. 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
75. Similarly, in the litigation concerning the 1978 oil spill from the Amoco Cadiz
off the north coast of France, the court engaged in precisely the same repetitive doc-
trinal analyses and balancing of interests that unnecessarily added extensive delays
and expense to the resolution of an admittedly complex and large scale litigation. In
re Oil Spill by the Amoco Cadiz off the Coast of Fr. on Mar. 16, 1978, 93 F.R.D. 840
(N.D. Ill. 1982); In re Oil Spill by the Amoco Cadiz off the Coast of Fr. on Mar. 16,
1978, 491 F. Supp. 170 (N.D. Ill. 1979), af'd, 699 F.2d 909 (7th Cir. 1983); In re Oil
Spill by the Amoco Cadiz off the Coast of Fr. on Mar. 16, 1978, 491 F. Supp. 161
(N.D. Il1. 1979) (repetitive use of balancing tests to decide motions involving the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, the act of state doctrine, subject matter jurisidic-
tion, personal jurisidiction, forum non conveniens, and foreign discovery issues).
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non conveniens motion in holding that there was no available forum
outside the United States. Similarly, the court had resolved every ele-
ment of the question of jurisdiction to prescribe in deciding that the
United States courts had sufficient interest in the dispute to enjoin fur-
ther attempts to interfere with their jurisdiction. An omnibus motion
decided under the unified theory would have been faster and cheaper,
by piercing to the real core of the dispute. It would have yielded the
same result and hardly could have acerbated the tensions between the
United States and Great Britain. In fact, a more straight forward asser-
tion of the sufficiency of the United States interest at the outset of the
dispute probably would have reduced the tension.
iI. Connecting the Threads with a Unified Theory
The fact that courts tend to treat each doctrine separately and assign
separate consequences to each doctrinal decision should not obscure
their fundamental unity.76 In Asahi, Arospatiale, and Reyno, the Supreme
76. The reason these doctrines appear so similar partly relates to the expansion
of U.S. jurisdiction following Alcoa and International Shoe, and the development of bal-
ancing tests as safety valves to prevent unfairness to litigants and to prevent jurisdic-
tion from being thrust upon the courts. See Allan R. Stein, Forum Non Conveniens and
the Redundancy of Court-Access Doctrine, 133 U. PA. L. REy. 781, 782-85 (1985) [hereinaf-
ter Stein, Forum Non Conveniens]; Jeremy D. Morley, Forum Non Conveniens: Restraining
Long-Arm Jurisdiction, 68 Nw. U. L. REV. 24 (1973); Albert A. Ehrenzweig, The Transient
Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: The "Power" Myth and Forum Conveniens, 65 YALE L.J. 311
(1956) [hereinafter Ehrenzweig, Transient Rule]; Edward L. Barrett Jr., The Doctrine of
Forum Non Conveniens, 35 CAL. L. REy. 380 (1947).
The scholars examining personal jurisdiction and conflicts of law have drawn some
of these parallels and postulated that the courts are really addressing slightly differ-
ent aspects of the same problem. See Harold G. Maier & Thomas R. McCoy, A Unify-
ing Theory for Judicial Jurisdiction and Choice of Law, 39 AM. J. COMp. L. 249 (1991);
Russell J. Weintraub, An Objective Basis for Reecting Transient Jurisdiction, 22 RUrGERS
L.J. 611 (1991); Carol Bruch Myers, Note, At the Intersection ofJurisdiction and Choice of
Law, 59 CAL. L. REV. 1514 (1971). The Supreme Court has recognized the relation-
ship of the minimum contacts analysis for personal jurisdiction and the nearly identi-
cal significant relationship test for the due process limitations for choice of law. See,
e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague,
449 U.S. 302 (1981); Clay v. Sun Office, Ltd., 377 U.S. 179 (1964); Watson v.
Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., Ltd., 348 U.S. 66 (1954); Home Ins. Co. v. Dick,
281 U.S. 397 (1930). But see SCOLES & HAY, CONFLIcrs OF LAw, supra note 48, at 93-
101 (drawing distinction between minimum contacts and significant relationship). In
a similar vein, conflicts of law approaches have been proposed for such issues as
extraterritorial jurisdiction and the application of the act of state doctrine. Sigmund
Timberg, International Combines and National Sovereigns: A Study in conflicts of Laws and
Mechanisms, 95 U. PA. L. REV. 575 (1947); Bruce Alan Rosenfield, Note, Extraterritorial
Application of United States Laws: A Conflict of Law Approach, 28 STAN. L. REV. 1005
(1976); Lawrence William Nelson, Sr., Note, The Conflict of Laws and the Extraterritorial
Application of the Sherman Act, 4 CASE W. REs.J. INT'L L. 164 (1972); Note, Extraterrito-
rial Application of the Antitrust Laws: A Conflict of Laws Approach, 70 YALE L.[. 259 (1960).
The redundancy of forum non conveniens also has been a topic drawing the interests
of constitutional procedure scholars. Stein, Forum Non Conveniens, supra; P. John
Kozyris & Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in the American
Courts in 1989: An Overview, 38 AM.J. COMp. L. 601 (1990); Symeon C. Symeonides,
Choice of Law in the American Courts in 1988, 37 AM. J. COMP. L. 457 (1989); David W.
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Court has all but acknowledged the unity of transnational procedure by
requiring essentially the same comity test for each procedural issue.
The existing doctrines have come to be defined too much by the differ-
ences in the timing of their consideration and the standard of appellate
review, rather than by the questions they ask and the allocation of power
between courts and litigants.77 What is lacking so far is a global unify-
ing vision of reducing these transnational procedural and jurisdictional
questions into a single inquiry.78
These various doctrinal strands can be most profitably viewed as
subparts of a larger inquiry: whether the United States court is an
appropriate forum for the resolution of the dispute through rules of
decision of its own choice. Each doctrinal strand examines a tiny sub-
part of this question. The problem is that the current system does so in
a repetitive, fragmented, and ad hoc manner up to the beginning of the
trial on the merits. Courts repeatedly seek to answer similar or identical
questions using open-ended balancing methodologies, which the parties
and the court are ill-equipped to handle.
United States courts should confront the larger inquiry definitively
at the outset of the litigation in a single omnibus determination of the
sufficiency of United States interests and whether foreign interests so
outweigh conflicting U.S. interests in a particular dispute to warrant def-
erence on comity grounds. The courts should require the parties, and
their governments, to confront these issues as early as practicable and
render their binding rulings.
The unification process should not be halted merely because certain
of the doctrines tend to emphasize institutional consideration and
national interests, while others tend to emphasize personal privilege and
private contacts with a forum. This is a false distinction that obscures
more than it reveals. The consideration of both public and private fac-
tors simply demonstrates that the field of transnational procedure com-
bines traditional aspects of public and private international law. 79
The courts should recognize that the current system asks multiple
versions of the same question and rarely provides a different answer to
any of the subparts. By considering an omnibus motion near the begin-
Robertson, Forum Non Conveniens in America and England: "A Rather Fantastic Fiction,"
103 L.Q. REv. 398, 421-24 (1987); Jeremy D. Morley, Forum Non Conveniens:
Restraining Long-Arm Jurisdiction, 68 Nw. L. REV. 24 (1973); B. D. Inglis,Jurisdiction, the
Doctrine of Forum Conveniens, and Choice of Law in Conflict of Laws, 81 L.Q. REV. 380
(1965) [hereinafter Inglis, Forum Conveniens].
77. See Stein, Forum Non Conveniens, supra note 76, at 786-95.
78. The article that comes closest to a unified theory oftransnational procedure is
Inglis, Forum Conveniens, supra note 76, which analyzes aspects of English procedure as
applied to transnational disputes. Inglis, however, is content to note the similarities
of the various doctrines in English law, and merely analyzes recent developments in
the English common law doctrine of forum conveniens rather than builds a system of
transnational procedure.
79. See Stephen B. Burbank, The World in Our Courts, 89 MicH. L. REV. 1456
(1991); Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100 YALE L.J. 2347
(1991); Allan R. Stein, Erie and Court Access, 100 YALE L.J. 1935, 2002 (1991).
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ning of the proceeding, the court can consolidate an important inquiry
in a cost-effective manner. The parties can conserve their time and
resources, and the court can be spared the necessity to delve constantly
into the merits of the case in order to consider gatekeeping matters.
Discovery could be limited to those facts necessary to resolve the
gatekeeping questions, just as initial discovery in class action litigation
normally is limited to the facts necessary to decide class certification. 80
In most cases, the court and the parties should be prepared to con-
front the issues inherent in the omnibus motion within six months of the
initiation of the litigation. Through its inherent powers to control its
own docket and its scheduling powers under Rule 16 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, the court can advance or postpone this date
upon a showing of good cause. If the court ultimately learns informa-
tion which caused it to question the validity of its initial determination of
the omnibus motion, it could always reconsider the matter.
The courts then must construct a single omnibus test to decide a
motion that raises all of the gatekeeping provisions. The consolidation
of the various tests already being used is perhaps the easiest part of the
change. Without regard to the labels previous used, it could be as gen-
eral as a test for reasonableness, 81 or as detailed as a multifactor list
combining all of the contacts, policies, and interests considered in the
existing doctrine. 82 However, the enumeration of the specific factors to
be considered and balanced are far less important than consolidation
and the confrontation of the common issues raised in a principled
manner.
83
The courts should not be deterred from confronting the merits of
the dispute in resolving the omnibus motion. Such "quick looks" are an
accepted part of both courts' consideration of most so-called procedural
issues and the current balancing of interest process in transnational dis-
putes, which depends in part on the nature of the alleged conduct of the
defendant. Through consolidation, the court would only peek once at
the merits of the dispute, and only to the extent that it sheds light on
whether the United States court should entertain the dispute. The court
should focus its inquiry of whether it is legally or practically competent
to adjudicate the dispute on the merits without gravely damaging the
interests of the United States as a nation. 84 If the answer is no, the par-
ties must go elsewhere to litigate. If the answer is yes, then the courts
must select the rules of decision which will govern the proceeding.
80. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION SECOND § 30.12 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE (1986) [hereinafter MCL2d].
81. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 2, § 403 (proposed originally to deal
with jurisdiction to prescribe).
82. See supra notes 2-65 and accompanying text.
83. The burden of proof normally will remain on the private parties since the
United States and foreign governments often are reluctant to participate in private
litigation, especially at the trial level. See Waller, Bringing Meaning to Interest Balancing,
supra note 15, at 954.
84. Id.
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Regardless of the sophistication of courts' balancing of interests,
consolidation would still save parties substantial time and money and
force courts to take such motions more seriously as they would only
have one opportunity to consider gatekeeping issues. The court and the
parties would not have the tactical opportunities to raise and resolve
these issues again and again throughout the pretrial phase of the litiga-
tion in increasingly discretionary formats. Instead, the parties would
have to marshall their best evidence for a single omnibus consideration
of these issues. The court similarly would concentrate its limited
resources to get the answer right the first time, or face reversal on
appeal, rather than being able to correct its rulings down the line
through later motions and such discretionary vehicles as forum non con-
veniens where the standard on appeal is much more favorable.8 5
A unified theory cannot force other countries to recognize that the
United States should have the exclusive or primary control over a partic-
ular dispute. Conversely, other nations cannot bar the United States
from proceeding where it is appropriate to do so, even if it is appropri-
ate or preferred to proceed elsewhere. The unified theory, however, is
powerful enough to require a United States court, in a manner consis-
tent with the Constitution, federal common law, and international law,
to answer the single threshold question of whether the United States has
a sufficient stake to proceed at all. That in itself would be a major step
forward.
II. Implementing the Unified Theory as a Matter of Binding Federal
Common Law
There are several potential obstacles that might impede the operation of
the unified theory set forth above. Conducting the balancing process in
a single unified inquiry should be constitutional and should satisfy the
due process constraints on the exercise of personal jurisdiction as long
as the court explicitly finds both minimum contacts and reasonableness
as set forth in Asahi.8 6 Little, if anything, more would be needed to sat-
85. The question arises whether the considerable time and effort of the court and
the parties should be directed to the selection of the best available forum rather than
merely an appropriate forum. Unfortunately, to do so would run head on into the
concept of concurrent jurisdiction, and the prospect of parallel proceedings, as a
fundamental principle of the international law. See S.S. Lotus (France v. Turkey),
1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 9 (holding that international law did not bar Turkey from
prosecuting French officers on French flag vessel causing collision resulting in death
of Turkish citizens); Laker Airways, Ltd. v. Sabena, Belg. World Airlines, 731 F.2d
909, 935-36 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (holding that neither England nor United States was the
exclusive or primary forum for litigation over demise of airline flying between United
States and Great Britain). As this author has noted elsewhere, a search for an exclu-
sive or primary forum for the resolution of any given dispute is probably illusory. See
Alan M. Simon & Spencer Weber Waller, A Theory of Economic Sovereignty: An Alternative
to ExtraterritorialJurisdictional Disputes, 22 STAN.J. INT'L L. 337 (1986); Spencer Weber
Waller & Alan M. Simon, Analyzing Claims of Sovereignty in International Economic Dis-
putes, 7 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 1 (1985).
86. See supra notes 25-32 and accompanying text.
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isfy the nebulous due process limitations in the choice of law area.8 7
Given the transnational nature of the dispute, the full faith and credit
clause would have no application.8 8
Such a single inquiry should also satisfy the requirements for juris-
diction to prescribe under international law. As set forth in a landmark
decision of the Permanent Court of International Justice, the Lotus case,
there are few international law constraints on a nation's assertion of
jurisdiction.8 9 The single inquiry also should satisfy traditional and
expanded modern formulations of comity90 and the emerging reasona-
bleness standard as set forth in the Restatement of Foreign Relations
Law.9 1 The single inquiry on its face would not appear to violate any
treaties or conventions to which the United States is a party. The uni-
fied theory could also be applied to satisfy the most favored nation9 2
and national treatment9 3 principles which have arguably risen to the
level of being rules of customary international law.
A. Uniformity and Erie
Principles of federalism do require close scrutiny of whether federal
courts could constitutionally formulate a binding single test as a matter
of federal common rule covering federal question cases, diversity litiga-
tion, and state court proceedings. While this is an important question,
federalism concerns ultimately do not prove to stand in the way of the
implementation of the unified theory as proposed.
It is the federal government which has the constitutional power to
conduct foreign affairs and regulate commerce with foreign nations.9 4
The explicit stripping of state authority in these fields was one of the
principal bases for creating the Constitution as an alternative to the Arti-
87. See supra notes 40-50 and accompanying text.
88. See Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930).
89. S.S. Lotus (France v. Turkey) 1927 P.C.IJ. (ser. A) No.9. Lotus concerned a
collision between a Turkish and French vessel which resulted in the death of Turkish
nationals. Turkey sought to prosecute the French officers that were believed to be
responsible for the fatal collision. The two nations asked the Permanent Court of
International Justice to decide the narrow question of whether international law pro-
hibited Turkey from prosecuting a criminal act which was assumed to have taken
place on French territory but produced harmful effects on Turkish territory. A
majority of the Permanent Court held that international law did not prohibit the
exercise ofjurisdiction under these circumstances. The court thus created a power-
ful, but not definitive, endorsement of the effects doctrine.
90. See Joel R. Paul, Comity in International Law, 32 HARV. INT'L LJ. 1 (1991).
91. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 2, § 403.
92. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. I, opened for signature Oct. 30,
1947, 55 U.N.T.S. 188, T.I.A.S. No. 1700. [hereinafter GATT).
93. Id. art. III.
94. U.S. CONST. arts. I §§ 8,10, II §§ 2-3, III § 2, VI. See generally, HAROLD
HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER AFTER THE
IRAN-CoNTRA AFFAIR (1990); Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION
(1972).
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cles of Confederation. 95 The Supreme Court also has indicated that the
federal government's ability to conduct foreign affairs existed as a fun-
damental aspect of sovereignty from the time of formal independence
from Great Britain.9 6
There has been an unbroken string of federal decisions prohibiting
the states from interfering with the setting of foreign policy and from
taking any action which threatens to interfere with the exclusive role of
the federal government in this area. These cases have relied upon the
commerce clause, the supremacy clause, and notions of express and
implied preemption to hold that the area of foreign relations is off limits
to the states.
The earliest cases interpreting the Constitution established that
state policies would be subordinated to the treaties and executive agree-
ments of the federal government.9 7 The Supreme Court in Gibbons v.
Ogden98 held that the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations
was an express grant of power to the federal government which the
states could not be permitted to impede or frustrate. Cases like United
States v. Curtiss- Wright 99 and Missouri v. Holland,1 00 which may be contro-
versial for other reasons, uniformly hold that it is the federal govern-
ment which is the "sole organ" for the conduct of foreign affairs. These
cases go as far as holding that in foreign affairs, state borders and state
sovereignty disappear, and the United States must act as a single entity
with no role for state interference. 101
The presence of foreign affairs considerations can limit or bar state
action within even the most traditional spheres of state sovereignty and
law making. For example, the Supreme Court in Japan Line, Ltd. v.
County of Los Angeles 1 0 2 overturned a local property tax scheme affecting
foreign property which may well have been constitutional under the
Commerce Clause if applied exclusively to domestic property. Similarly,
95. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 62 n.9 (1941). See generally Louis HENKIN,
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONsTrrTION 227 (1972); THE FEDERALIST Nos. 3-5 (John
Jay), Nos. 10, 22, 80 (Alexander Hamilton), No. 42 (James Madison).
96. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936); Holmes v.
Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540 (1840); Penhallow v. Doane's, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 54
(1795).
97. Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1795). See also Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366
U.S. 187 (1961); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1941); United States v. Bel-
mont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
98. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1, 187-89 (1824).
99. 299 U.S. 304 (1936) (executive order prohibiting arms sales to South Ameri-
can countries during hostilities in 1930s constitutional given broad interpretation of
Executive Branch foreign affairs powers and broad construction of Congressional
delegations of authority in foreign affairs matters).
100. 252 U.S. 416 (1920) (upholding constitutionality of treaty restrictions involv-
ing migratory birds based on foreign affairs powers).
101. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1941); United States v. Belmont, 301
U.S. 324 (1937).
102. 441 U.S. 434 (1979). See also Xerox Corp. v. County of Harris, Tex., 459 U.S.
145 (1982) (invalidating local property tax on goods manufactured in Mexico and
stored in bonded warehouse awaiting international shipment).
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in Zschernig v. Miller,'0 3 the Supreme Court invalidated a state probate
law which involved explicit foreign policy judgments about the rights of
American citizens to inherit, on a reciprocal basis, in other countries.
Federalism in the context of foreign affairs means a diminution and
potentially the extinction of the role of the states. The concerns that
animate the doctrine of Erie R.R. Co. v. TompkinsI 0 4 evaporate in this
context. 10 5 Erie's predecessor, Swift v. Tyson, 10 6 held that federal courts
were free to fashion a general federal common law in diversity actions in
federal court. Erie reversed Swift to the extent that Swift had authorized
federal courts to create general federal common law.' 0 7 However, Erie
addressed only the question of whether the Federal Judiciary Act of
1789 authorized the creation of general federal common law to displace
state common law rules in diversity actions. The decision addressed no
other basis as a potential source for the application of federal common
law, since no other source of federal authority was applicable to the
diversity tort action at issue in Erie.
Erie did not forbid the application of federal common law to matters
of an exclusively or predominantly federal nature.1 08 While it is often
difficult to determine the precise boundaries of the federal domain in
other contexts,' 0 9 foreign affairs and foreign commerce are matters that
Erie leaves untouched. 0 The Constitution, through the foreign affairs
103. 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
104. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
105. Stein, Erie and Court Access, supra note 79, at 2002-06. See also Alfred Hill, The
Law-Making Power of the Federal Courts: Constitutional Preemption, 67 COLUM L. REV. 1024
(1967); John Norton Moore, Federalism and Foreign Relations, 1965 DUKE L.J. 248;
Louis Henkin, The Foreign Affairs Powers of the Federal Courts: Sabbatino, 64 COLUM. L.
REV. 805 (1964); Phillip C. Jessup, The Doctrine of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins Applied to
International Law, 33 AM.J. INT'L L. 740 (1939). For a more general discussion as to
when federal interests, including international relations, call for the application of
federal common law, see ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 293-322
(1989); Louise Weinberg, Federal Common Law, 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 805 (1989). Cf.
James Edwards, The Erie Doctrine in Foreign Affairs Cases, 42 N.Y.U. L. REv. 674 (1967)
(criticizing Sabbatino decision but arguing that Supreme Court could have federalized
act of state doctrine under federal question jurisdiction).
106. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). More specifically, Swift held that § 34 of the Fed-
eral Judiciary Act of 1789 should be interpreted as calling for the application of state
constitutional and legislative rules, rather than common law rules, in federal diversity
actions.
107. 304 U.S. at 78 ("There is no federal general common law").
108. See Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie- And of the New Federal Common Law, 39
N.Y.U. L. REV. 383 (1964).
109. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965); Byrd v. Blue Ridge Elec. Coop.,
356 U.S. 525 (1958); Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
110. Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63 (1966) (state law must give
way where there is federal authority, a significant conflict with state policy, and an
overriding need for uniformity). Accord Miree v. DeKalb County, Ga., 433 U.S. 25
(1977). See generally ScoLEs & HAY, CONFLICTS OF LAW, supra note 48, at 136-52; Ron-
ald A. Brand, Enforcement of Foreign Money-Judgments in the United States: In Search of
Uniformity and International Acceptance, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 253 (1991) (arguing
that federal common law provides basis for unifying enforcement of foreign judg-
ments throughout United States).
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powers of the executive branch, the commerce clause, the supremacy
clause, as well as the inherent sovereignty of the United States as a
nation under international law, eliminate much of what would otherwise
present a difficult federalism issue.
One of the more difficult components to fit in this framework is the
doctrine of forum non conveniens. While the federal doctrine of forum
non conveniens is applied in both federal question and diversity litiga-
tion, 11 1 the courts have not yet suggested that states are preempted
either from adopting different versions of the doctrine or from abolish-
ing it altogether. In fact, several states have abolished the doctrine
through legislation or judicial decision.1 12 Commentators such as Allan
Stein have suggested that court access devices such as forum non con-
veniens may serve traditional and legitimate state interests which federal
courts should respect under Erie.113
Regardless of the correctness of this assertion in garden variety
domestic litigation, the result should be different for transnational litiga-
tion. Notions of comity, federalism, supremacy, and the constitutional
aspects of foreign affairs and foreign economic regulation suggest that a
federal court may forbid a state from keeping its courts open where the
United States as a nation lacks a substantial interest in a dispute. 114
Whatever leeway normally enjoyed by the states does not carry over
into the transnational arena. As Professor Stein ultimately acknowl-
edges: "Questions about international comity are, in effect, questions of
foreign affairs that should be subject to a uniform federal policy."' 15
The inherently federal nature of transnational procedure is demon-
strated by the fact that most of the evolving Federal Rules of Transna-
tional Procedure" 16 have arisen in the context of Supreme Court
decisions setting forth rules of decisions binding on both federal and
state courts. For example, the Supreme Court has declared that federal
law controls the enforceability of forum selection clauses in transna-
tional disputes. 1 7 The application of the minimum contacts test in the
international arena as set forth in Asahi arose in the context of a state
court product liability dispute. The open-ended balancing test for
111. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981); Gulf Oil v. Gilbert, 330 U.S.
501 (1947); Kostner v. American Lumbermans Mut. Casualty Co., 330 U.S. 518
(1947). See also Sibaja v. Dow Chem. Co., 757 F.2d 1215 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 474
U.S. 948 (1985) (applying federal forum non conveniens doctrine to dismiss suit in
favor of Costa Rica despite contrary Florida state rule).
112. See, e.g., Dow Chem. Co. v. Castro Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d 674 (Tex. 1990), cert.
denied, - U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 671 (1991).
113. Stein, Erie and Court Access, supra note 79.
114. This assertion should be no more controversial than the assertion that a state
may not keep its court open to a dispute where the parties lack minimum contacts to
the forum or the act of state doctrine dictates judicial abstention.
115. Stein, Erie and Court Access, supra note 79, at 2002.
116. See Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, supra note 79, at 2390 & n.217.
117. Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, - U.S. -, 111 S. Ct. 1522 (1991); Stewart
Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22 (1988), affirming, 810 F.2d 1066 (lth Cir.
1987); cf. Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
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choice of discovery rules in Aerospatiale also arose in a diversity product
liability and wrongful death action.
Similarly, the Supreme Court in Sabbatino explicitly held that the act
of state doctrine is a rule of decision binding on both state and federal
courts.1 18 As a corollary to the act of state doctrine, both state and fed-
eral courts further are bound by a foreign government's interpretation
of its own legal pronouncements.1 19
The legitimacy of uniform federal law in transnational litigation is
implicit in the nature of the balancing test mandated in every Supreme
Court case in this area. In requiring the balancing of the interests of the
United States and foreign nations involved, the Court has recognized
that even nominally private disputes can involve important federal and
international interests that must be considered in determining whether
to assume jurisdiction. 120 This process requires the parties to stand in
the shoes of their governments and present arguments on issues that go
far beyond the boundaries of the dispute that brought them before the
court. 12 1 The resulting public nature of the decision process and its
actual and potential effects on the diplomatic and economic interests of
the United States as a nation fit nicely within the traditional exclusive
federal powers in this area. Any lack of uniformity in state rules inher-
ently threatens federal interests, especially because the United States is
responsible at the international level for the state court decisions. 122
B. Uniformity and Klaxon
The only serious limitation on the development of a unified theory of
transnational procedure through binding federal common law appears
to arise in the area of conflicts of law. In Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg.
Co. ,123 the Supreme Court has indicated that the policies underlying the
Erie doctrine require the application of state conflict of law rules when
the underlying rule of decision is provided by state law.
The Supreme Court in Day & Zimmerman, Inc. v. Challoner 124 applied
Klaxon to determine whether Texas or Cambodian law should apply in a
federal diversity wrongful death suit involving premature detonation of
an artillery shell in Cambodia. The trial court declined to apply Texas
118. 376 U.S. at 421-27.
119. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 220 (1942); United States v. Belmont,
301 U.S. 324 (1937).
120. In doing so, the Supreme Court may well have demolished the public/private
distinction which has hampered the development of a unified field of international
law. See Joel R. Paul, The Isolation of Private International Law, 7 Wis. INT'L L.J. 149
(1988).
121. See Waller, Bringing Meaning to Interest Balancing, supra note 15.
122. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 2, § 207; Moore, Federalism and Foreign Rela-
tions, supra note 105, at 285, (citing PHILLIP C. JESsuP, THE USE OF INTERNATIONAL
LAw 101 (1959); 6JOHN BAss'r MOORE, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 837 (1906)
(United States payment of indemnity because of failure of New Orleans officials to
prevent lynching of Italian citizens)).
123. 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
124. 423 U.S. 3 (1975).
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conflict of law rules which would have required the application of the
substantive law of Cambodia, as Cambodia was the place of the acci-
dent.' 25 The district court chose to apply the substantive law of Texas
and its principle of strict liability, reasoning that Cambodia had no suffi-
cient interest in the dispute to justify the application of its law.' 26 On
appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed.12
7
The Supreme Court reversed in a two page per curiam opinion hold-
ing that the federal court was required to proceed in exactly the same
manner as if it were a state court hearing the same dispute.' 28 The
Court stated:
A federal court in a diversity case is not free to engraft onto those state
rules exceptions or modifications which may commend themselves to the
federal court, but which have not commended themselves to the State in
which the federal court sits. The Court of Appeals in this case should
identify and follow the Texas conflicts rule.' 29
Challoner was an unfortunate interruption in the process of identify-
ing and applying the exclusive federal interest in the regulation of for-
eign relations and foreign commerce that affects the United States. The
initial decision of whether Cambodian or American law should be
applied to this dispute concerns the interests of the United States as an
entity, and not the interests of any of its political subdivisions.'1 0
Nonetheless, the decision in Challoner does not negate the utility of
the unified test, but merely modifies its application. Unless and until the
Supreme Court is prepared to acknowledge the unique federal status of
transnational litigation,' the unified test must take into account the
requirements of Klaxon and Erie and incorporate by reference state con-
flicts rules in state court litigation and federal diversity actions.
The omnibus balancing test as proposed is capable of incorporating
state conflicts rules when necessary. The court may never reach the con-
flicts question if it concludes that the United States is not an appropriate
place to resolve the dispute. The difficulty in selecting or applying the
applicable law may itself help determine that the United States is not an
appropriate forum. If the United States is an appropriate forum, then
the court would normally have to decide through its own conflicts rules
125. Id. at 3.
126. Id. at 3-4.
127. 512 F.2d 77 (5th Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded, 423 U.S. 3 (1975).
128. 423 U.S. 3 (1975).
129. Id. at 4-5.
130. The actual outcome of Challoner appears to be harmless since Cambodia pre-
sumably has no interest in the outcome of the case regardless of whose law is applied.
131. See Moore, Federalism and Foreign Relations, supra note 105, at 286-87 (criticizing
application of Klaxon to international conflicts questions); Eugene F. Scoles, Interstate
and International Distinctions in Conflicts of Laws in the United States, 54 CAL. L. REV. 1599,
1604-05 (1966) (characterizing international conflicts questions as predominantly
federal interest); Albert A. Ehrenzweig, Interstate and International Conflicts Law: A Plea
for Segregation, 41 MINN. L. REV. 717 (1957) (separate rules for international conflicts
question). Cf. Laycock, Equal Citizens, supra note 50, at 259-61 (highlighting different
bases of domestic and international choice of law issues).
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what law to apply to resolve the dispute. Challoner only affects the latter
process and constrains the court in limited circumstances in determining
which internal United States rules should apply to select the applicable
law.
C. Avoiding the Need for Statutory Change
While the federal courts have the power to create a unified theory as a
binding federal common law of transnational procedure, the question
remains whether the unified theory should be implemented through
statutory change. Approaching the issues of transnational procedure
through legislation or amendment to the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure would bring both certainty and legitimacy to the field of transna-
tional procedure, but would also create severe problems. Statutory
change requires a sufficient critical mass of congressional concern that
seems unlikely given a congested legislative calendar. Such a consensus
would be difficult to achieve and could take years to develop. Achieving
such change through amendment to the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure also requires the active participation and concurrence of the
Supreme Court,' 3 2 which so far has been content to develop the area
through piecemeal federal common law rules.
Even if the Congress or the Supreme Court support a statutory
change, a set of transnational procedure rules would require a complete
consensus as to all of the details-the factors to be balanced, the weight
to be given to each factor, the type of evidence to be used in the balanc-
ing process, and the standard of decision and appellate review. If a new
statute or rule were adopted, the courts would still have to engage con-
stantly in the interpretation and implementation of the statute in light of
the complex, fact-sensitive balancing process.
No statute or rule could possibly address every aspect of the pro-
cess involved in weighing the U.S. and foreign interests in a transna-
tional dispute litigated in the United States courts. Preserving the
federal common law aspects of the present system but systematizing,
unifying, and accelerating the timing of the balancing process can bring
both efficiency and meaning to the process, while allowing flexibility for
experiment when novel problems arise.13 3
132. 28 U.S.C. § 2072.
133. The strengths and weaknesses of relying on statutory change are embodied in
the proposed CONFLICTS OFJURISDICZTION MODEL ACT ("CJMA"). See James Wawro,
ModelAct Provides a Solution, NAT'L LJ. Jan. 29, 1990, at 17 (Conflicts ofJurisdiction
Model Act, Report of ABA Subcommittee on Conflicts ofJurisdiction). See generally,
Louise Ellen Teitz, Taking Multiple Bites of the Apple: A Proposal to Resolve Conflicts of
Jurisdiction and Multiple Proceedings, 26 INT'L LAw. 21 (1992). The CJMA was drafted by
a subcommittee of the Litigation Committee of the American Bar Association Section
of International Law and Practice, including this author, to address the issue of
antisuit injunctions.
The CJMA calls for an initial determination at the outset of the litigation that a
court represents the primary or best forum to resolve the dispute. CJMA § 1. Under
the CJMA, the court normally must determine within six months of the initiation of
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IV. A Proposed Manual for Transnational Procedure
What is needed is not so much statutory change or amendment to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, but the promulgation of a Manual for
Transnational Litigation. Such a Manual would be premised on the suc-
cess of the Manual for Complex Litigation Second ("MCL2d")134 which
has guided, but not altered, the application of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in complex civil litigation. The MCL2d and its predecessors
have been developed and refined since 1950 to address the proliferation
of class action, multiparty, multidistrict, and other types of complex liti-
gation.13 5 It has always been explicitly premised on the assumption that
modem oversized litigation could be managed in an appropriate man-
ner through the sophisticated application of existing procedural
rules. '3 6
the litigation whether there are other proceedings or foreign courts with jurisdiction
over the dispute. Id. § 2.
The court must then determine if it should proceed to resolve the dispute on the
merits or defer to one of the other available fora. In this respect, the CJMA appears
closer to an international application of the concept of forum conveniens. See Stein,
Forum Non Conveniens, supra note 76, at 844-46; Albert A. Ehrenzweig, Transient Rule,
supra note 76, at 312-14; Inglis, Forum Conveniens, supra note 76.
In making this determination under the CJMA, the court must consider the same
familiar factors from other doctrines and balance as many as fourteen open-ended
factors relating to the interests of the United States and foreign court. CJMA § 3.
The CJMA then sets forth the types of evidence to consider in the balancing process.
Id. § 4.
The CJMA uses a carrot and stick approach to enforcement matters. A judgment
by a court selected as the proper forum under the CJMA is accorded presumptive
validity, while a conflicting judgment of any other court need not be enforced.
The CJMA has had a substantial impact in a relatively short time. Connecticut has
enacted the CJMA by statute: Act Concerning International Obligations and Proce-
dures, Public Act No. 91-324. The CJMA is under consideration by California and
various bar associations in the United States and abroad. See Teitz, Taking Multiple
Bites of the Apple, supra at 25 n. 17; Conflicts of Jurisdiction and Enforcement of For-
eignJudgments, California Law Revision Commission, Staff Draft and Recommenda-
tion, May 11, 1992.
While the CJMA is a step towards the right direction, it raises several problems.
First, the CJMA comes dangerously close to an assertion of a doctrine of exclusive or
primary jurisdiction which is inconsistent with the customary international law norm
of concurrent jurisdiction. See supra note 85. Second, by casting the CJMA as a uni-
form law for adoption by states and other nations, there is an implicit assertion of
helplessness in the absence of the adoption of the CJMA as positive law by statute or
treaty. Finally, the CJMA was intended primarily to address the question of antisuit
injunctions and did not explicitly consider the broader ramifications of all aspects of
transnational litigation.
134. MCL2d, supra note 80.
135. See Handbook of Recommended Procedures for the Trial of Protracted Cases,
25 F.R.D. 351, 355 (1960); Seminar on Protracted Cases, 23 F.R.D. 319 (1958); Sem-
inar on Protracted Cases, 21 F.R.D. 395 (1957); Procedure in Anti-Trust and Other
Protracted Cases, 13 F.R.D. 62 (1951); Breck P. McAllister, The Big Case: Procedural
Problems in Antitrust Litigation, 64 HARV. L. REV. 27 (1950). See generally 6A CHARLES
ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1530 (1990).
136. MCL2d, supra note 80, at 1. See also E. Donald Elliott, Managerial Judging and
the Evolution of Procedure, 53 U. Cm. L. REV. 306 (1986); Richard A. Chesley & Kath-
leen Woods Kolodgy, Note, Mass Exposure Torts: An Efficient Solution to a Complex Prob-
lem, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 467, 512-13, 516, 532-33 (1985).
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The MCL2d approaches complex litigation by focusing on the need
for intensive and effective judicial management of complex matters, the
role of counsel in the expediting of litigation process, and the early for-
mulation and resolution of procedural and discovery issues through
conferences and timetables. 13 7 The MCL2d provides additional gui-
dance on the settlement, trial, and appeal of complex cases.1 38 It then
applies these principles in a variety of specific settings.13 9 Finally, the
MCL2d contains various checklists, forms, orders, and supplementary
material on attorneys fees and sanctions to assist the court and
parties. 140
The time is ripe for a Manual for Transnational Litigation ("MTL").
Transnational litigation represents the next tidal wave of litigation
sweeping down on both state and federal courts. Foreign parties and
foreign located evidence play a significant part in the full range of com-
mercial and tort litigation coming before the courts and are no longer
confined to the more sophisticated federal statutory causes of actions
such as antitrust or securities regulation. The cases involving transna-
tional procedural issues now arise most often in general commercial,
products liability, and tort litigation. 141 Asahi, Aerospatiale, and Reyno are
all standard tort litigation which could arise in any state or federal court.
The need for a MTL is all the more pressing given the lack of famili-
arity, expertise, or interest in either the state or federal judiciary in mat-
ters dealing with public international law, international commercial law,
or transnational litigation. Until recently, few courts saw such issues at
all, let alone building up a body of expertise in the research and resolu-
tion of the complicated issues involved. Not only was there little oppor-
tunity for systematic judicial training, 14 2 most courts were further
137. MCL2d, supra note 80, §§ 20.1, 21.1, 21.2, 21.24, 21.32.
138. Idl §§ 21.6, 22-3, 25.
139. These include class actions, multidistrict litigation, criminal cases, and spe-
cific civil matters such as antitrust, mass disaster, securities, takeover, employment
discrimination, and patent litigation. Id. §§ 30-33.
140. Id. §§ 40-42.
141. An interesting example is a breach of contract and fraud case filed in the Cen-
tral District of California involving an Illinois and a California corporation litigating
over the performance of a long term printing contract. On the face of the complaint,
the lawsuit appeared to be a garden variety diversity commercial dispute. However,
the litigation quickly assumed international proportions because the California plain-
tiff was a wholly owned subsidiary of a Danish corporation whose chairman lived in
Sweden. The president of the California subsidiary at the time of the dispute was a
Finnish citizen who had returned home to Helsinki by the time the litigation pro-
ceeded to discovery. A portion of the dispute related to the performance of machin-
ery which had been manufactured in Canada and Germany. In addition, when the
plaintiff terminated the printing contract with the defendant, it switched to a Dutch
printing company. See International Masters Publishers, Inc. v. Bradley Printing Co.,
et. al., Case No. CV 89-2143 (AWT).
142. The expansion of both the LEXIS and Westlaw databases to include interna-
tional and foreign legal materials may be the most positive development in providing
courts meaningful access to the tools needed to comprehensively research interna-
tional law issues. See, e.g., Basic Documents, available in LEXIS, in International Eco-
nomic Law file available under the International Law library.
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burdened by the lack of library and research facilities to address interna-
tional law issues.1 43 At its best, the MTL could bring together judges,
practitioners, and scholars in the drafting of a comprehensive manual
covering all aspects of transnational procedure which the MCL2d and
the other sources on complex litigation virtually ignore. 144
The MTL would assist courts in rationalizing their treatment of
transnational litigation. It should include analysis of all of the. current
doctrines that the courts face in transnational litigation as well as the
basic principles of international law. In addition to the jurisdictional
and procedural doctrines discussed in this article, the MTL ideally
should include issues of service of process, the act of state doctrine, sov-
ereign immunity, the foreign compulsion defense, the enforcement of
foreign judgments in the United States, and the enforcement of United
States judgments abroad. The MTL must emphasize the unity of these
doctrines and their role in the litigation process, acknowledging and
accommodating the legitimate interests of affected foreign countries.
Discovery abroad should be the next broad area of focus. The MTL
should analyze the unilateral and multilateral mechanisms for discovery
of evidence abroad as part of the broader transnational litigation pro-
cess. It should also address the international legitimacy of the United
States approach to that process. Here, the courts and the parties need
to be sensitized to the fact that in most civil law jurisdictions, the litiga-
tion process is judicially controlled and any discovery conducted by the
court is quite limited. Without such information, the parties and the
courts cannot conduct a meaningful analysis of the choice of discovery
rules or inderstand why a foreign nation would ever have a legitimate
interest in avoiding the use of the broader lawyer controlled Federal
143. See Judicial Education on International Law Committee of the Section of International
Law of the American Bar Association: Final Report, 24 INT'L LAW. 903 (1990). In an
encouraging note, the American Society of International Law will soon conduct train-
ing session for federal judges in basic international law doctrine. However, this train-
ing will be limited to federal judges initially and cover only the fundamentals of
public international law.
144. The current MCL2d acknowledges the complexity of transnational litigation
but only devotes seven pages to the subject, all relating to extraterritorial discovery.
MCL2d, supra note 80, at 86-93.
Similarly, the Complex Litigation Project of the American Law Institute focuses on the
consolidation of mass tort and contract litigation across state and federal district lines
and the resulting conflict of law issues and addresses transnational litigation only in
passing. See American Law Institute, Complex Litigation Project (Tent. Draft No. 3,
1992).
Finally, the Restatements prepared by the American Law Institute normally are lim-
ited to a treatment of a particular doctrinal area such as Conflict of Laws. At the
other extreme, the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law attempts to restate, sys-
temize, and reform a vast area of international law topics including the nature of
international law and its relationship to United States law, persons in international
law, international agreements, the law of the sea, the law of the environment, the
protection of persons, international economic relations, and remedies for violations
of international law. While Part IV of the Restatement covers jurisdiction and judg-
ments, it is not focused on the litigation process.
Cornell International Law Journal
Rules of Civil Procedure.' 45
Concentrating on the process of litigation is a natural way to high-
light the unity that is absent under the current system. The courts need
to be as active and managerial as in any complex case, and must inter-
vene early and set schedules for the presentation, briefing, argument,
and decision of an omnibus motion on procedural and jurisdictional
matters. As in other types of complex litigation, the court should use its
full managerial powers through initial conferences, scheduling orders,
and waves of discovery to unify these considerations into omnibus
motions and require the filing and resolution of such motions as early as
possible.
The sequencing of motions and modes of discovery set forth in the
MCL2d is based upon the Court's inherent powers to control its own
docket and the express powers contained in Rules 16, 26, 37, and 42 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 146 These powers are more than
sufficient to provide a basis for a similar requirement of an omnibus
motion covering transnational jurisdiction and procedure.
The courts could then rely upon the MTL to assist them and the
parties in analyzing the complex constellation of interests and contacts
in performing the required balancing of interests. The court can then
enter binding orders before proceeding to a decision on the merits. The
MTL would assist the court and the parties in referring to materials both
in the United States and abroad which would document the interests at
stake in a particular litigation. The material could easily be broken
down by subject matter, as in the current MCL2d, since the intensity of
United States and foreign interests may differ dramatically depending
on whether the disputes concern antitrust, securities, product liability,
contract, or other statutory or common law issues.
The MTL should include the full text of any multilateral or bilateral
treaties such as the Hague Conventions on Service of Process and the
Taking of Evidence that are applicable to litigation in the United States.
The MTL should also include a full complement of forms, model plead-
ings, and draft orders so that parties and the court would not have to
reinvent the wheel each time a routine request is made.
A well crafted MTL is likely to become a definitive source of gui-
dance given the lack of familiarity, interest, and experience of most
courts in transnational issues.147 The MTL could also play an important
role in bringing meaning to the interest balancing process and in creat-
ing an evidentiary based record, as opposed to using primarily rhetorical
arguments as to the contacts and interests to be balanced by the
145. The MTL also needs to discuss the various foreign privacy and blocking laws
that may interfere with the production of discovery materials. It needs to separate
the question of which discovery rules apply from the question of whether U.S. discov-
ery obligations will ever be excused on the grounds of conflicting foreign law
requirements.
146. MCL2d, supra note 80, § 20.1.
147. See Waller, Bringing Meaning To Interest Balancing, supra note 15, at 948.
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The widespread adoption of the procedures of the MCL2d suggest
a similarly important role for a MTL. The MCL2d has been widely cited
by both federa1 4 9 and state courts in addressing its chosen subject mat-
ter.1 50 The MTL can guide courts and practitioners in coming to grips
with the internationalization of United States civil procedure and show
the way to the management of such transnational disputes in a cost
effective, efficient, and fair manner.
Conclusion
Courts in the United States have addressed gatekeeping issues in trans-
national litigation seriatim as a result of historical and constitutional rea-
sons rather than for reasons of logic or efficiency. The various doctrines
of jurisdiction to prescribe, subject matter jurisdiction, personal juris-
diction, choice of law, and forum non conveniens in transnational litiga-
tion are all separately conceived responses to the growing assertiveness
of United States courts over conduct abroad by foreign entities.
The balancing of interests system which evolved is collapsing under
its own weight. The courts and parties are asked, as many as six times in
any particular litigation, to engage in a complicated, unstructured, time
consuming, and expensive balancing process prior to the resolution of
the merits of the dispute. The nearly identical nature of these doctri-
nally distinct tests is increasingly obvious each time the Supreme Court
speaks regarding an aspect of transnational procedure.
The time has come to discard the labels and combine these inquir-
ies into an omnibus inquiry of why a United States court should resolve
a particular dispute and what rules should govern its resolution. Facing
up to this more candid inquiry as early as possible would bring clarity
and legitimacy to principled decisions where the litigants and the United
States have strong interests in resolving the disputes in our courts. Poor
decisions would be deterred through open and candid scrutiny subject
to significant appellate review, rather than being obscured by a haze of
doctrinal formalism.
The omnibus test can be implemented as a matter of binding fed-
eral common law without statutory change and save time and resources
for both courts and the parties. Currently, courts revisit the same issues
with uneven results throughout the litigation and with varying degrees
of discretion and appellate review. With the implementation of the
omnibus test, the focus properly shifts to the real issue hidden in the
current system-the determination of a balancing of interests test based
148. Id. at 951.
149. A LEXIS search in March 1992 for "Manual pre/3 Complex Litigation"
retrieved over six hundred federal cases citing the Manual for Complex Litigation.
150. A similar LEXIS search in March 1992 retrieved 35 reported state decisions
citing the Manual for Complex Litigation primarily for issues relating to class actions,
settlements, attorneys fees, and the handling of discovery issues.
132 Cornell International Law Journal Vol. 26
on evidence and not merely rhetoric. A correct and proper balancing
can be facilitated through the diligence of the parties and the court
guided by the collective experience embodied in a Manual for Transna-
tional Litigation.
